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TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE
EFFECT OF PREDICTION AND MISPREDICTION
J.P. Craven*

The impact of new technology on the evolutionary development of
the Law of the Sea is not always clear or discernible at the time of its
introduction. In this time of technological revolution the development
alternatives for enjoyment and exploitation of the sea and its resources
are legion, but recent history is replete with proof that neither economic
determinism or rational military strategy is a major factor in determining
which technologies are developed and which are neglected. It does not
take an astute observer who has read the text of the United Nations
Treaty on the Law of the Sea to realize that large portions of the text
are based on major mispredictions as to the resources of the deep seabed
and the imminence of their development. Less obvious but equally true
is that major ocean development alternatives have been overlooked or
ignored in the developing law of the sea. The author has been involved
for more than thirty years with this process of prediction and misprediction and prudence would suggest that he excuse himself from the
process. The temptation to use these experiences as feedback for the
next estimate is, however, too great, and once again an attempt will be
made to predict the directions that sea technology will take and the
probable effect of these technologies on the Law of the Sea.
The author's first major undertaking in this regard appeared in The
Naval Institute Proceedings of April 1966 which, by virtue of normal
delay in preparation and publication, had a prediction benchmark of
1964-65. The ocean developments which were deemed significant related
to nuclear powered deep submersibles, saturated diving and man-in-the
sea, and the tools and sensors associated with these forms of entry into
the sea. The relevant technological conclusions were as follows:
For the greater portion of the continental shelf (0 to 3000 feet)
the economic use of man and machines for extensive and prolonged engineering operations is virtually assured within the next
decade [i.e., by 1975]. The magnitude of national effort devoted
to this technology is still contingent upon the assessment of the
military significance of the continental shelf, and the assessment
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of its resources and of its scenic and recreational potential. For
the next geographic areas of interest, the ocean ridges and sea
mounts (6000 to 8000 feet), the capability to deploy vehicles
and to mount installations is virtually assured within the next
decade (sic 1975). In the next two decades [i.e., by 1985] the
commercial deployment of vehicles and machines in these areas
is highly probable; and by the end of the century the economic
use of men and machines in these areas is again contingent
upon an as yet unassessed military, economic and cultural potential. For the final areas of interest, the broad ocean basins
(12,000 to 20,000 feet), within the next decade [1975], the capability to visit selected areas of the bottom and to perform
light engineering missions is virtually assured; within the next
two decades, the deployment of vehicles and machines in these
areas is highly likely; and by the end of the century, the extensive
economic deployment of a wide class of commercial and military
vehicles is a distinct possibility.
A hindsight modification of this forecast would not materially
change the technological capability forecast but would downplay
the commercial application and highlight the military and scientific developments. Commercial continental shelf capability did
indeed develop and men and machines are commercially available
to depths of 1000 feet. A few commercial submersibles are
capable at depths from 3000 to 6000 feet. There are no commercial deployments on the ocean ridges and sea mounts but
submersibles and towed devices are now exploring the manganese
crusts and polymetallic sulfides at these depths. The military
capability at these depths is best exemplified by the Soviet titanium submarines said to have a depth capability of 6000 feet.
In the deep ocean the Japanese and the Americans have developed and proved a number of configurations of deep ocean
mining machines but their commercial use at the end of the
century must now be deemed a possibility, not a "distinct possibility."I
The author's 1966 paper was completely silent as to polymetallic
nodules, the use of the ocean for the disposal of toxic and nuclear
wastes, the development of ocean thermal energy, and the development
of aquaculture as a significant alternative to fishing.
As late as 1965, the International perception of the Law of the Sea
could be summarized by the author as follows:

1. Craven, Sea Power and the Sea Bed, United States Naval Institute Proceedings
36, 48-49 (Apr. 1966).
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The present embodiment of the Law of the Sea can be found
in the partially ratified United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 29 April 1958. Although agreement on this convention was hampered by unilateral attempts to extend the territorial waters from three miles to six to even 200 miles, no
significant effect on the basic rights and freedoms of the seas
has yet been discernible.
It is already established that emoluments of sovereignty or
ownership already obtain in the sea bed. The relatively recently
ratified Treaty of the Continental Shelf confers sovereign rights
to the continental shelf out to a depth of 200 meters, or to the
depth of practicable exploitation to those nations having borders
on the sea. Granting the technology that has been forecast here
and using the latter of these definitions, it is clear that the
ability to exert sovereign rights in the sea bed has already received
2
tacit approval.
On the basis of the forecast technology and this capsule summary of
the Law of the Sea as then constituted, the author made his projections
on the future of the Law of the Sea as follows:
The next question which will certainly be raised with respect
to the law of the sea, is the extent to which these sovereign
rights in the seabed confer additional rights in the waters above
the sea bed, the waters well above the seabed, and the free
surface above the sea bed. Certainly some rights akin to those
which have delineated the legal rights on land from those in
the air will develop. If an exact analogy were drawn, (though
it probably will not be) the right to transit over that portion
of the seabed whose sovereignty has been established would be
the prerogative of the sovereign and the cherished freedom of
the sea would thereby be abolished. While this extreme limit
may not be reached, the right to regulate the jettison of material
over occupied areas of the sea bed, the right to regulate traffic
above and around occupied areas of the seabed, and the right
to discriminate between peaceful and belligerent transit over
occupied areas of the sea bed may well result as emoluments
of sovereignty. The establishment of boundary lines, particularly
along elements of the bottom which define major geographic
entities across which commercial and military passage will be
regulated is not a far fetched extention of the trend of law and
technology.

2.

Id. at 37, 49.
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If, now, sovereignty over the bottom is established to a depth
of 3,000 feet and the accompanying technology developed, then
the British Isles, Cuba and the other Caribbean Islands will lose
their status as islands. The Soviet Union and the United States
will have a common border no longer separated by the Bering
Strait ....
If sovereignty is further established to a depth of
10,000 feet and the accompanying technology develops then the
Atlantic ocean will be cleaved by a great ridge in the Northern
and Southern hemispheres which divides it into an eastern and
western basin. In the Pacific, the extensive chains of seamounts
divide the Pacific ocean into a significant number of basins
which are now identifiable by the sea mounts which constitute
Wake, Guam, the New Hebrides, the Fijis, the Gilberts, the
Marshalls, the Ryukyus, the Kuriles, etc ....
If ultimately, sovereignty is established to the full depths of the ocean, effectively
20,000 feet, then there exists the complex and politically difficult
task of dividing a territory more than three times as large as
that of the present land mass and the establishment of appropriate international relationships which will still admit of the
control, management and utilization of the mineral, animal, and
plant rights which are contained therein.3
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

As of 1985 this projection of the division of the seabed into regimes
of National Sovereignty and the extension of this Sovereignty to the
water column and the free surface through some mechanism of "creeping
jurisdiction" seems incorrect or premature. Article 76 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as
UNCLOS III) limits Continental shelf jurisdiction to a maximum of 350
nautical miles from the base line of the coastal state, to that depth
which occurs not more than 100 miles from the 2,500 metre isobath,
and in any event not less than 200 nautical miles.
The bathmetry definition (were it the only criterion) would be allinclusive of the East China Sea, the North and Baltic Seas, the Arabian
Sea and the Bay of Bengal but would not be all-inclusive of the Caribbean or the Mediterranean. The mid-Atlantic ridge is excluded as are
most sea mount chains except where the islands in the chain are not
separated by more than 400 miles. Coastal states, rights in the continental
shelf are sovereign and exclusive but limited to the exploration and
exploitation of natural resources.
The seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is defined in
UNCLOS III as "The Area" and the common heritage of mankind.
No state may claim sovereignty, and a United Nations Authority acts
as the trustee for "mankind." While not claiming sovereignty over the
Area or any part thereof, the United States rejects the United Nations'

3.

Id. at 49-50.
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claim of exclusive jurisdiction over the management and allocation of
the resources of the Area. Whether or not a property right over the
resources of the deep sea bed vests in the "common heritage" and is
not subject to alienation without permission of the Authority is a matter
of international legal debate. 4 Thus, eventual national sovereignty in the
sea bed beyond current areas of national jurisdiction is not yet foreclosed
but seems far less likely than it did in 1965.
The author's projection of the future of the Law of the Sea had
little if any effect on the course of events, but assessments of technology
played a major and determinative role in the substance of UNCLOS.
It was his own technology assessment (not dissimilar to that of the
author's) that prompted Arvid Pardo5 to introduce the famous "Malta
Resolution" in 1967. Although no specific ocean resource was identified
in that document, the preliminary conference in Geneva and the first
session of UNCLOS III in Caracas devoted a great deal of time and
attention to an assessment of deep ocean resources.
On the basis of existing literature, it is highly unlikely that Pardo
had the polymetallic (i.e., manganese) nodules in mind when he introduced the resolution. The previous year the Law of the Sea Institute
had held the first of its annual meetings. The paper on ocean mining
was presented by Bascomb. 6 He stated, "I should perhaps note that in
our search for undersea minerals, we began at the top of the scale with
diamonds, and then we descended through platinum and gold, tungsten,
tin and we are getting down to the lower levels now. I think we may
never get down to manganese nodules." In 1968 the Second Report of
the President to the Congress of Marine Resources and Engineering

4. See M. Pinto, Alternatives in Deep Sea Mining 13 (S. Allen & J. Craven eds.
1978). ("The 'common heritage' of these resources is not res nullius to be had for the
taking; is not res communis simply for enjoyment or use in common; it is more akin to
property held in trust-held in trust for 'mankind as a whole,' for the public. It is
therefore closest to res publicae, the property of the people to be administered by the
people and for the people.").
5. See United Nations General Assembly, Proposal for a Declaration and a Treaty
Reserving the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond Territorial Limits For Peaceful Purposes
and Use in the Interest of Mankind. Note verbale from the Permanent Mission of Malta
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, U. N. Document A/6695 Aug.
18 1967). The memorandum states in part: "In view of the rapid progress in the development of new techniques by technologically advanced countries, it is feared that the
situation will change and that the seabed and the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond
present national jurisdiction, will become progressively and competitively subject to national
appropriation and use. This is likely to result in the militarization of the accessible ocean
floor through the establishment of fixed military installations and in the exploitation and
depletion of resources of immense potential benefit for the world, for the national
advantage of technologically developed countries."
6. Bascomb, Mining in the Sea, in The Law of the Sea (L. Alexander).
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Development 7 was highly optimistic with respect to ocean minerals but
referred to polymetallic nodules only by implication.

The initial international interest in this specific resource was probably
initiated by John Mero through both his Ph.D. dissertation' and his
book on Ocean Minerals. 9 As President of the newly formed Ocean
Resources Corporation, Mero reported on Alternatives for Mineral Exploitation at the Second Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute. 0
In that paper he gives nearly equal prominence to ocean thermal energy

(and its associated artificial upwelling) and to the manganese nodules.
He predicts economic viability for both in "from ten to twenty years"
(i.e., 1976-1986).
In 1973 the conference fixed upon the manganese nodules of the

deep sea bed as the primary mineral resource of the Area. Although
the stimulus for this interest was probably initiated by John Mero, the
credibility of his projection was given impetus by the much publicized

Summa Corporation venture. It was clear to observers that a great deal
of capital was being invested in the experimental ship Glomar Explorer

and its equipments. Other consortia concerned over the impending shortage of strategic metals and not wishing to lose the competitive edge had
also launched exploratory development programs. Deep Sea Ventures

was organized in 1968 and developments on the part of Kennecott and
International Nickel were initiated at about the same time. By 1977

there were five major consortia who were actively involved in evaluation
of the technology and economics of manganese nodule mining."
It was not revealed until 1975, well after the establishment of manganese nodule mining as the basis for the Deep Sea Bed negotiations

that the Glomar Explorer operation was in whole or in part a cover
for and intelligence operation of the United States Central Intelligence

7. See Marine Science Affairs-A Year of Plans and Progress: Second Report of
the President to the Congress on Marine Resources and Engineering Development ch. 4
"Encouraging Development of Non-Living Resources" (Mar. 1968) (Industry might be
quickly attracted to the deep sea, however, if rich deposits of a mineral in high demand
such as nickel and copper are discovered in the deep sea, or if there are technological
breakthroughs.).
8. J. Mero, The Mining and Processing of Deep-Sea Manganese Nodules (Univ. of
Calif. at Berkeley, Institute of Marine Resources, 1959).
9. J. Mero, The Mineral Resources of the Sea (Elsevier Publishing Corp., New
York, 1965).
10. J. Mero, Alternatives for Mineral Exploitation, Proceedings Second Conference,
Law of the Sea Institute (June 1967).
11. The major consortia were: Deep Sea Venture Group (U.S. Steel, Union Minier
of Belgium and the Sun Corp.)-International Nickel Group (INCO Ltd., Canada; AMRMetallgesellschaft Preussag, Germany; Domco-Sumitomo, Japan; and SEDCO Inc., U.S.)Kennecott Group (Rio Tinto Zinc, U.K.; Noranda Mines, Canada; Mitsubishi, Japan; BP
Minerals, U.K.)-Lockheed Group (Lockheed, U.S.; Amoco Minerals Co., U.S.; Billiton
International Metals, Netherlands; and Bos Kalis Westminster, Netherlands)-Afernod
Group (BRGM, France; CNEXO, France; and Chantiers, France).
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Agency. 12 By this time the Convention was fully involved in a debate
over the economic significance of this deep sea bed resource. The conference in Caracas itself devoted an evening to a technical seminar
featuring three projections of the worth of the nodule resource. A
political overlay was clearly evident in the projections, it was the view
of the United States 3 and the industrialized nations not possessing land
based resources of cobalt, copper, and nickel, that only with advanced
technology and continued growth of world demand would the deep sea
bed operations be marginally profitable and that there would not be a
significant surplus available for distribution to developing nations. It
was the view of the mineral-rich nations such as Canada, Chile, Zaire,
etc., that either as the result of subsidy or because of economies of
scale that there was a danger that deep sea bed mining would flood
the world markets with nickel and thereby destroy the income of landbased producers and in particular third world land-based producers. It
was the view of third world nations who were not mineral producers
that the deep sea bed mining would indeed supply adequate return to
justify the establishment of both an Authority and an Enterprise. As a
result of these competing views the negotiated regime became very complex, resembling more a mining code than a treaty. It is probably a
historical first for a treaty to contain a regression formula in the body
of the text. In any event, the text on the Area deals almost exclusively
with the particulars of the manganese nodules and manganese nodule
mining. As against the elaborate provisions in the text (Article 151
production policies) and Annex III (Basic conditions of prospecting,
exploration and exploitation) as they relate to polymetallic nodules is
the simple paragraph 9 of Article 151 which states "The Authority shall
have the power to limit the level of production of minerals from the
Area, other than minerals from polymetallic nodules under such conditions and applying such methods as may be appropriate by adopting
regulations in accordance with Article 161, paragraph 8."
The protracted negotiations for the treaty were in the process of
being concluded at about the time that the technology evaluations and
economic projections of the consortia were being completed. The technology development was indeed successful in the sense that equipments

12. See C. Burleson, The Jennifer Project (1977). This account alleges that the genesis
of this project was the loss of a Soviet submarine in 1968 resulting in an attempt on the
part of the Central Intelligence Agency to recover portions of the lost submarine. The
recovery was to be effectuated utilizing a ship, the Glomar Explorer, specifically designed
and constructed for this recovery operation. The account further alleges that the recovery
of manganese nodules was the cover for this operation and that this cover story was
publicly promulgated by the Summa Corporation in 1971.
13. See A. Capstaff, Jr. Profitability of the Industry and Competition, Proceedings,
Tenth Conference, Law of the Sea Institute (1976). The "MIT" model predicts "that
with careful management and the absence of royalty impositions, first generation ocean
mining projects can allow the sponsoring firms to be competitive and realize a profit."
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and the knowledge required to design equipments for the harvest of
manganese nodules from the deep ocean now exists. On the other hand,
the most pessimistic of estimates of the economic viability of nodule
mining proved to be highly optimistic. A leveling off and even a decrease
in world consumption of these metals, the depressed state of the world
economy, and the high cost of initial capital conspired to make investment in ocean mining a losing proposition. In a landmark paper
delivered in October of of 1981 Flipse concluded that
[flor a gross investment of one and one half billion dollars
or a fixed capital investment of about one billion dollars in a
complete vertically integrated deep ocean manganese nodule mining system producing three metals (nickel, copper and cobalt)
yielding approximately $420 million in annual revenues, a before
tax profit of about $140 million can be expected. With after
tax profits of about $71 million, the simple return on investment
is less than 5%, resulting in a payback period that exceeds the
productive life of the project. The internal rate of return after
taxes is only 4.7% 4
This economically depressing news was accompanied by the discovery
of the polymetallic sulfides, high density pipes of metallic sulfides where
the metal content is 25% or more and where the energy to extract the
metal from the ore is substantially less than that associated with the
nodules. In 1985 Malahoff 5 reported the results of current investigations
of pipes of polymetallic sulfides located in the shallower ocean fracture
zones at depths of about 2,500 meters. These deposits if located on
land would be immediately exploited as mineral mines. A different suite
of equipments but having the same ocean technology characteristics as
required for nodule mining must be developed to exploit these resources,
but the relative richness of the deposits suggests that the world priority
for deep sea minerals will refocus on these newly discovered deposits.
In addition, national interests have focused on the cobalt-manganese
crusts within the two hundred mile zones associated with oceanic sea
mounts. While the economic value of these cobalt crusts does not
immediately seem to be different than the economics of the nodules,
protagonists point to the shallower depths, 3,000 to 6,000 feet and the
strategic value of the cobalt to nations who do not have a ready landbased supply. In any event, the author's 1965 prognostication that
commercial exploitation of the mineral resource of the ocean would not
take place before the turn of the century now seems to be an accurate
prophecy and the polymetallic sulfides now seem to be the most likely
prospect.

14. J. Flipse, The Economic Viability of Ocean Mining, Proceedings, Fifteenth Conference, Law of the Sea Institute (E. Miles & S. Allen eds. 1982).
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The misprediction of technology by the conference has thus resulted
in the establishment of an Authority and an Enterprise, a number of
mine sites, and the expenditure of millions of dollars to meet the
requirements of a "pioneer investor." In the long run, the most significant deficiency of the Seabed portion of the UNCLOS text is in its
ommissions, in its failure to provide an appropriate regime for those
resources in the area beyond national jurisdiction which will have economic and social significance.
Before we examine the possibilities in this regard we should identify
the deficiencies which may also exist in the regime for the territorial
sea, the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone.
If there has been a misprediction of technology with respect to these
zones it has probably been a misprediction as to the cost and capability
of the system which is required for enforcement. In the absence of
additional bilateral agreement, adherence to the UNCLOS text places
the burden of enforcement and remedy for damages on the technology
of enforcement. Article 73 states that the "coastal state may, in the
exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage
the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures,
including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial procedures as may be
necessary to insure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted
by it in conformity with this Convention."
The absence of other mechanisms of enforcement suggests that the
framers of the treaty expect that the dominant remedy is arrest by a
military warship of the coastal state followed by an action in rem. In
view of immunities associated with the high seas such arrest can not
take place unless there are "reasonable grounds" for believing that the
ship has violated the rights of the coastal state in the exclusive economic
zone. Article 111 stipulates, for example, that "hot pursuit is not deemed
to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such
practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued or one of
its boats or other craft working as a team and using the ship as a
mother ship is within the limits of the territorial sea, or, as the case
may be, within the contiguous zone or the exclusive economic zone or
above the continental shelf."
Enforcement thus implies a technology of surveillance by aircraft
or on rare occasions when the lack of cloud cover permits, by satellite,
of continuous track and trail by the surveillance craft until a military
or government enforcement ship can arrive on the scene and an arrest
can be made. In areas such as the Hawaiian archipelago this involves
(for that one region alone) an area of 600,000 square miles and transits
from the port of Honolulu as great as 1200 nautical miles before an
arrest can be made. If purposeful violations occur, the evidence of their
occurrence is at best anecdotal. Arrests which do occur are limited in
liability to the value of the ship and cargo. If the economic cost of
arrest is significantly less than the economic gain of violation then the
regime will be unenforceable.
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The United States through the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act (MFCMA)I5 has greatly eased the burden placed upon
its Coast Guard. The MFCMA requires nations who wish to fish in the
200 mile zone to have concluded a Governing International Fishery
Agreement. This agreement must contain a number of specific provisions
of which the most important may be permission for an authorized United
States officer "to board and search or inspect, any such vessel [i.e.,
fishing vessel] at any time," to require transponders or other position
fixing equipment to be placed aboard the fishing vessel, to station
observers on the vessels, to have agents appointed who are authorized
to receive and respond to process, and to carry the burden that "it
shall be a rebuttable presumption that all fish found on board a vessel
seized in connection with an act prohibited by section 307 were taken
or retained in violation of this Act."
These substantial surrenders of traditional high seas freedom rights
are not applicable to nations who have not signed the agreement. For
such nations enforcement is heavily dependent upon the technology of
enforcement and the additional sanction of prohibitions on the import
of fish and fishing products which are caught by those nations. This,
of course, raises the very real problem of "laundered fish" and high
seas "laundries."
As a result of the GIFAs the situation in the 200-mile Fishing
Conservation Zone of the United States is almost devoid of armed
conflict, but the combination of anecdotal information, the cost of
enforcement, budget restrictions, the ever increasing mission requirements
of the Coast Guard, and the huge area of the economic zone suggest
that violations are, or would be, difficult to detect. The problems will
be greatly compunded if technology is employed by the violators to
prevent their detection and/or arrest.
Although the MFCMA has greatly eased but not eliminated the
enforcement burden of the United States with respect to fisheries, far
more aggressive challenges to the "at sea enforcement" capabilities of
the Coast Guard exist with respect to the importation of drugs and
other illicit substances and the illegal immigration of aliens. Once again
the United States has eased its enforcement burden through bilateral
agreements which surrender traditional high seas freedoms, but the evidence is so abundant that these measures are at present ineffective that
no citation is needed.
If the United States is unable to cope with the enforcement problem
in its territorial waters, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone,
then the problem must be compounded for less wealthy and less tech-

15. See A. Malahoff, Polymetallic Sulfide/Cobalt Crusts: Where Are They and What
Are They Worth, Proceedings, Eighteenth Conference, Law of the Sea Institue. Malahoff
cites submersible, multi-beam sounding and towed body technology as being the keys to
the discovery, assessment and evaluation of the poly-metallic sulfides and cobalt crusts.
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nologically developed nations. The de facto situation in the South China
Sea and the Gulf of Siam has been documented as well as it can by
Child.16 She describes a continuous saga of armed conflict at sea between
fishermen and patrol craft, of illegal detentions, of extensive loss of
life, and enforcement by "a stance of territorial bravado." She concludes
"enforcement of ocean law is disturbing in a jurisprudential sense to
the extent the process indicates that resort to armed violence as a
problem-solving device is preferred to legal decision making processes."
Thus, mispredictions of technology have resulted in a regime beyond
national jurisdiction which is specific and detailed with respect to a
resource that will probably not be developed and vague or silent with
respect to resources that are more promising, and a regime of coastal
state jurisdictions which is unenforceable without substantial and cooperative bilateral and multi-lateral agreements. These deficiencies will
of necessity be remedied, but the appropriate remedy itself requires a
new prediction of the thrust of ocean technology. These technologies
will be divided into those which will have an effect on the law of the
sea in the area beyond national jurisdiction, and those technologies
which will affect the scope and substance of coastal state jurisdictions.
Some new technologies will take place within all of these jurisdictions
which will have a profound social and economic impact, but vili not
affect the law of the sea. These will not be considered here.
In the area beyond national jurisdiction, it is the opinion of the
author that the most significant technological developments are those
associated with the development of ocean thermal energy and the concomitant resources associated with the induced artificial upwelling.
The UNCLOS III treaty is not silent on the subject of ocean energy
but limits its consideration to a clause of paragraph l(a) of Article 56
to the effect that coastal state jurisdiction extends to activities "such
as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds." This
brief entry suggests that the technological forecast for ocean energy did
not portend a major ocean resource. It is now clear to the developers
of this resource that this is not the case. They now recognize that while
the search for ocean resources has concentrated on offshore oil, manganese nodules, and fishing, except for Mero's prescient prediction in
1967, we have overlooked the fact that deep ocean water is itself a
resource that might result in the economic production of energy, fresh
water, and marine protein. The late John Isaacs 7 has pointed out that
the productivity of the ocean is equal to the productivity of the land
but that the standing crop of ocean biomass is a very small percentage

16. T. Child, Enforcement of 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone Claims Over Living
Marine Resources in Southweast Asia Proceedings, Thirteenth Annual Conference Law of
the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii.
17. Personal communication, John Isaacs, Professor Scripps Institution of Oceanography (circa 1975).
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of land biomass. He further pointed out that if oceanic plant life had
found an evolutionary path which would have permitted the development
of roots of the length of one thousand feet or more, then the standing
crop of the ocean would be able to match the standing crop of the
land and the farming of such biomass would constitute the source for
the major productivity of the ocean. In contrast, the present harvest of
fish, which in the main is limited to areas of natural upwelling, would
be a minor element of this productivity. The absence of protein derived
from the hunt is, of course, the characteristic of land-based animal
protein supply.
Most of us associate the deep ocean water with the source of cold
required for the production of ocean thermal energy. Indeed, the original
developers of ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) did not envision
the cold water pipe as having the nature of an "Isaacs root." The
aquaculture potential of the deep ocean water was clearly recognized by
some of the pioneers and in particular by Oswald Roels.' s On the other
hand, protagonists for for the open cycle system recognized the value
of OTEC as a generator of fresh water. As a result, an increasing
number of advocates now see the potential of Ocean Thermal Energy
systems as the source of the three building blocks of a sea based societyfood and fibre, fresh water, and energy.
Various aspects of OTEC have been explored at the Natural Energy
Laboratory of Hawaii since its inception in 1974.' 9 It is from the results
of this laboratory that we can now appreciate the true nature of the
deep ocean resource. Fundamentally, the deep ocean water has four
important characteristics: (1) the medium is biologically pure and has
no pathogens, no bio-fouling organisms, and no unwanted organisms;
(2) the medium contains abundant quantities of nutrients which though
diluted are easily recovered; (3) the medium is cold by commercial
standards; and (4) the energy costs for bringing this fluid to the surface
are trivial. The beneficial qualities of this fluid have revealed themselves
in experiments on coldwater biofouling, 20 the aquaculture of nori, spirulina, salmon, trout, lobster and abalone, 21 the utilization of the fluid
in laboratory processes requiring chilling or air conditioning, and even

18. 0. Roels, K. Haines & J. Sunderland, The Potential Yield of Artificial Upwelling
Mariculture, Tenth European Symposium on Marine Biology (1975).
19. T. Daniel, OTEC and Coldwater Aquaculture Research at the Natural Energy
Laboratory of Hawaii, Ke-ahole Point, Proceedings of the Pacific Conference on Marine
Technology PACON 84, Marine Technology Society (Honolulu, Hawaii 1984).
20. B. Larsen, Effect of Biofouling and Countermeasures on Heat Transfer in Surface
and Deep Ocean Hawaiian Waters, ASME/JSME Thermal Engineering Joint Conference
(Honolulu, Hawaii Mar. 1983).
21. F. Menscher, R. Spencer, J. Woessner, S. Katase & D. Barclay, Growth of Nori
in an Experimental OTEC Aquaculture System in Hawaii, 14 J. World Mariculture Soc'y
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in the successful agriculture of strawberries. 22
We have thus learned that a major asset of the cold in the cold
water lies in its temperature regulating qualities as much as in the absolute
value of the temperature. As is well known to marine biologists the
growth rate of marine animals and plants is highly sensitive to the
precise temperature of the water (within about one degree Celsius) with
a different temperature required at different times in the life cycle. To
achieve this result by chilling (the reverse process of ocean thermal
energy production) is inefficient and therefore requires a great deal of
energy. The warming of the deep water through some form of heat
exchange is on the other hand a very economic process. Because different
processes require different temperatures, the water can be used a number
of times. For example, water which is appropriate for the production
of energy is too cold for aquaculture. Since the cold water does not
need to be treated to prevent biofouling, the discharge water can be
used for aquaculture. Waste water from the aquaculture is still cold
enough to be used for the agriculture of plants like strawberries or for
the utilization for air conditioning and other industrial chilling processes.
The nutrient value or artificial upwelling value of the cold water
has been dramatically demonstrated in the production of seaweed and
kelp. Growth experiments on nori demonstrate that algal forms such as
this are capable of absorbing as much as forty percent of the nutrients
in the water in a single pass. This rapid and efficient conversion is
demonstrated in the production of abalone. Here the deep ocean water
is employed to grow an algae which is the appropriate food for abalone
in the juvenile phase. The deep ocean water is also employed as the
growth medium for large tanks of giant kelp which are harvested as
food for the growing abalone. The same fluid is employed for the
abalone. The nutritional specifics are, of course, proprietary but the
ocean nutrients are an important element of the growth process.
The major significance of the deep water aquaculture projects is in
the proven establishment of industries which are now economically viable
and profitable. This permits the other uses of the deep water to be
developed as by-products which need not amortize the cold water pipe
and pumping system. An evolutionary developmental path is thus established which will ultimately lead to the development of grazing ocean
thermal plants on the high seas which produce energy, fresh water, and
marine protein for export. The export of energy will require the production of a transportable fuel. The Applied Physics Laboratory (APL)
of Johns Hopkins University 23 has developed a process for the production
of methanol utilizing grazing ocean thermal energy plants for the pro-

22.
23.

See Annual Report Natural Energy Laboratory of Hawaii (1984).
W. Avery, "OTEC Methanol" Applied Physics Laboratory Johns Hopkins Uni-

versity, October 1981.
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duction of hydrogen by electrolysis of fresh water which is combined
with carbon monoxide from soft coal to produce the desired product.
The economic studies by APL aver that this process is economically
viable in today's market without the need for by-product income. Given
the experience with the economic models for manganese nodule mining,
such a projection might well be tempered with skepticism, but given
the already proven commercial viability of OTEC aquaculture, the economics of energy production are drastically altered in a most favorable
way. Similarly, the use of open cycle energy generation systems will
produce large quantities of fresh water. The product value of the energy,
the fresh water, and the marine protein will be of the same order of
magnitude.
The author has already demonstrated 24 that legal constraints on the
design and operation of these ocean thermal plants will give the economic
and competitive edge to grazing plants which operate on the high seas
in waters beyond national jurisdiction. The imagined scenarios associated
with the manganese nodule resource will not become real as applied to
the ocean thermal energy resource. Coastal states in the tropical waters
will desire that competitive production be limited or eliminated in areas
beyond national jurisdiction. Third world nations, on the other hand,
will probably identify the resource as the common heritage of mankind
and will seek to include its management and development under the
Enterprise and the Authority. No present construction of the treaty text
would authorize such jurisdiction. It is interesting to speculate as to the
legal situation which would result if the ocean thermal energy operation
was a part of a mining enterprise. In such instance and under the terms
of the UNCLOS text, would the enterprise be allowed to engage in the
sale of energy aquaculture and freshwater byproducts of the energy
generating operation? Jurisprudential scholars who have studied the history of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution would
undoubtedly argue that some form of creeping jurisdiction from sea bed
mining to ocean column economic exploitation is not inconceivable.
One such path derives from the nature of the geothermal vents
associated with the generation of polymetallic sulfides. The water temperatures associated with these vents is on the order of 300 degrees
Celsius. A simple pipe loop containing a process fluid (e.g., fresh water)
would produce commercial steam at the surface. The in situ generation
of power for such a loop would clearly be one of the world's most
economic forms of power generation, involving, as it would, a conventional standard commercially available steam generation plant and a
fuelless source of steam. One or two minor technical problems associated
with the positioning of the loop in the geothermal resource would require

24. J. Craven, Legal Constraints on Ocean Thermal Energy Systems Design, Proceedings at Spring Meeting Society of Naval Architects & Marine Engineers (Honolulu,
Hawaii 1983).
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the application of engineering expertise but are clearly resolvable. The
primary economic problem is the identification of a sea-based product
which could benefit from the application of this low cost energy. Quite
obviously a hybrid OTEC-geothermal vent plant would be highly efficient
in power generation and at the same time highly productive of aquaculture protein and fresh water. It is probably not debatable that such
an energy source would be a resource of the deep seabed. Its full
economic potential would not however be realized without the addition
of the resource of the water column.
Given political and economic inhibitors it is highly likely that the
development process for these ocean resources will be delayed beyond
the turn of the century. If, however, current projections of world energy
demand in the twenty-first century materialize, then on the basis of
technology acquired in the last few years, the development of these
ocean resources is virtually assured.
Of much more imminence on the horizon is the inadequacy of the
coastal state regimes and the speed with which advanced technology is
accelerating the inadequacy. The first intimations of a perceived need
for these modifications appears in the New Zealand decision to declare
the ports of that country as nuclear free zones. Quite obviously the
New Zealand intent is to limit the now virtually inevitable (author's
conclusion) nuclear exchange to the Northern hemisphere. The prohibition of nuclear weapons from its ports is however, quite meaningless
unless a legal regime is established which prohibits the deployment of
nuclear weapons on the high seas and establishes some legal means for
inspection and verification of military ships and aircraft. At the present
time the nuclear powers find such a regime to be anathema.
Of more immediate concern to the United States is the flow of
illicit substances and illegal aliens across its coastlines. Attempts at
resolution have already caused the United States to substantially modify
merchant ship immunity through the concluding of bilateral agreements.
Indeed a number of such agreements already exist which permit the
military ships of one nation the right to detain and inspect the ships
of another on the high seas. Such arrangements are encouraged by
Article 108 of the UNCLOS treaty. The treaty already includes an
enlargement of the circumstances under which an otherwise immune ship
can be detained, inspected, and arrested on the high seas. These include
the traditional "reasonable grounds" associated with piracy and the
slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, failure to show a flag, and
disguised nationality when confronted by a warship of the same nationality. To this is added the arrest and inspection rights associated
with the exclusive economic zone and the arrest and detention rights
under paragraph 6 of Article 219 for vessel source pollution when it
appears that major damage impends.
New technologies will clearly favor those who would violate existing
law. This will most probably take place when low-cost, long-range
submersibles are introduced on a scale comparable to that which now
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exists with aircraft. The first (and as yet unrecognized) breakthrough
in this regard has been the development of the Knapp pre-buckled
submarine hull.25 Stripped of the sophistries of structural analyses it
suffices to say that this hull can be constructed of flat plates which are
glued or welded together in an unsophisticated and relatively crude
manner. A second (in fact unneeded) breakthrough is in the development
of a device which can extract oxygen from sea water such as fish extract
oxygen from sea water, or in the alternative the development (as is now
underway) of an efficient fuel cell. In either of these last two alternatives,
or with the cumbersome but none-the-less effective use of conventional
storage batteries, it is possible to develop sustained undersea voyages
for one of these low-cost backyard submersibles for voyages of the
order of 500 to 1000 miles. The potention for smuggling of illegal aliens
or illicit cargoes is obvious. The current law seems to be based on the
presumption that all submarines are military vessels and enjoy military
vessel immunity on the high seas. Unless restrictions are placed upon
military submarines in the contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone
so that they may be appropriately identified, then the smuggling submarine will enjoy an unacceptable ambiguity until it reaches the territorial
sea.
But advances in military technology itself will place heavy pressure
on coastal states toward the modification of the law of warship immunity. In this regard technology advances may make strange reversals
of view. For example, the current direction of United States strategic
policy is toward the development of space-based weapons for the intercept of ballistic missiles which, being launched at a distance from
the United States, require an out-of-atmosphere trajectory. The complete
and successful development and deployment of such a system will however be impotent against even the current array of SLCM (Sea Launched
Cruise Missiles) and SLBM's (Sea Launched Sub-orbital Ballistic Missiles)
which are legally deployed outside of the three mile territorial sea. It
is not only the proximity of these seabased weapons that is threatening,
but the fact (of which the public and indeed a substantial fraction of
the military are unaware) that the titanium hull submarine is virtually
indestructible, even when opposed by nuclear weapons.2 6 For example
a 6000-foot-depth-operating submarine is invulnerable to a uniform overpressure of approximately 3000 psi when operating at depth, or approximately 6000 psi when operating near the surface. A nuclear weapon
which is launched against one of these submersibles would therefore
have to be quite close to the submarine in order to have a destructive
effect. The submarine itself has a good defense since the most tech-

25. R. Knapp, Numerical and Experimental Stability Analysis of a Pseudo-cylindrical
Shell IASS/cism, Symposium on Folded Plates & Spatial Panel Structures (Undine, Italy
Sept. 1974).
26. Janes Fighting Ships-1984-1985, at 507 (London 1986).
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nologically sophisticated attack weapons will have a maximum underwater velocity of not more than one hundred miles per hour. A response
time of approximately one minute is thus available to the submarine
for the launch of interceptors and for evasive action. The submarine
kill rate in such an encounter will be very low.
In the face of such a peacetime seabased threat the only alternative
for the United States (or for that matter the Soviet Union) is the legal
establishment of either nuclear free or militarily free zones in order to
force the sea based weapons into the area which is protected by the
ballistic missile intercept system. Given the long lead time for a strategic
missile intercept system, its cost, and the low probability of technical
success, the need for this nuclear free ocean option is probably deferable
to the turn of the century; however, all arms control strategies are
directed toward that day when there is adequate inspection of potential
launch sites wherever they may be.
Other technologies of significance are under development or are
being implemented-stable platforms for floating factories, stable ships
for marine mass transportation, and even floating cities. 27 However, all
of these will take place in the territorial sea where coastal state sovereignty is already supreme. The United States may still wish to reexamine
its own decision to limit its territorial sea to three miles, and coastal
states of the United States may wish to benefit from any extension of
this zone of sovereignty, but it is most probable that these changes will
come about more by politics than by technology. In any event, the
author has now set the stage for his own prediction and misprediction
of technology and the law of the sea for the next twenty years and
looks forward to that happy day when he can once again assess the
validity of long-term prediction and the prediction process.

27. J. Craven, Cities of the Future: The Maritime Dimension-How Big and Still
Beautiful? Macro-Engineering Revisited (Davidson, Meador, & Salkeld eds. 1980).

